‘The Queen’s File’: How the Mossad got to King Hussein of Jordan’s mother

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Call him “Aleph” – that’s what his colleagues in the London Station did. Not the abbreviated “A,” a potential cause of confusion, as in Hebrew the letter could indicate a word beginning with E, I, O or U. So use “Aleph” – ambiguous enough, as it could mean an Avi or Eli or any number of other possibilities, perfect for 1960 and the height of the Cold War, so cold that John Le Carre’s spy did not even try to come in from it.

Aleph was a Mossad katza, short for Collection Officer, but in espionage jargon a Case Officer, whose mission is to recruit human sources and run them. Katzas meet their agents, give them tasks and upon receiving reports, hands them their wages. This is routine, unless the agent double-crosses his handler, ambushing him, sometimes fatally, or if local law enforcement authorities break up the meeting.

Aleph worked under diplomatic cover out of the Israeli embassy, which gave him immunity from arrest and prosecution if caught breaking UK laws, but no immunity from displeasure or worse between respective governments, were that to happen.

Newly declassified Israel National Archives files allow a peek into one such spy story, relating to Israel’s secret attempts to cultivate relations with King Hussein of Jordan and related intriguing tales, though teasing about the full repercussions, as later accounts are still under seal.

On April 2, 1962, a cable reached Avraham Cohen at the Middle East Department of Israel’s Foreign Ministry. The department analyzed regional affairs and served as a point of contact with the Mossad.

Cohen was a seasoned intelligence officer and Hashemite watcher an expert on Jordanian sources and informers, several of whom he recruited, briefed and debriefed himself. In the 1940’s, he had been a frequent visitor to King Abdullah’s court. He was later a senior military intelligence officer and headed the agent-running Military Intelligence Unit 504, many of whose personnel would over the years transfer to Mossad or the foreign ministry.

Avraham Cohen, a seasoned Israeli intelligence officer and Hashemite watcher, expert on Jordanian sources and informersWikipedia

The cable contained dramatic news about HAYOGEV, the code-name for a Jordanian source who frequented London and was affiliated with Arab newspapers and radio stations. He had been run as a source out of London for a decade by various handlers, among them Mordechai Gazit, later Director-General of the Foreign Ministry and Golda Meir’s confidant.

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Israel’s intense interest in Jordanian sources flowed from strategic necessity: The country was vulnerable to incursions from the long shared border, stretching alongside the West Bank until the Arava desert, and was dead set against Iraqi or Syrian forces being stationed in Jordan.

“HAYOGEV was arrested with our rep, Aleph, on the night of 30/3 by Scotland Yard. They were taken to the police, where Aleph made clear that HAYOGEV is writing articles for Kol Israel and in this meeting [where the police picked them up] provided two [articles] and in return received 10 pounds, two bottles of gin and a box of cigarettes, for his hospitality.

“Aleph said he is renouncing his diplomatic immunity and handing over the articles so that they can be certain no espionage is involved. HAYOGEV is in favor of a thaw with Israel, which to Arabs smacks of treason.”

Aleph stuck to his cover story. “When released he left behind the two articles and the Arab journals and asked to meet with HAYOGEV to talk him into cooperating. He repeated his comments to him, in the presence of detectives.

“The arresting officers were surprised by Aleph’s identity, and though he presented a Foreign Ministry document, they asked for an additional one. Our guess is that an Inspector and another man were there routinely, saw two out of place types exchanging items and rounded them up.”

There was, however, another possible explanation, rather than this tale of a police inspector chancing on suspicious activity in a London pub. Instead, this could have been a counter-intelligence operation, led by the Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch, whose officers are tasked by MI5. Any scent of derring do connected to the Cold War would have brought them into play, as the report continues:

“The target may have been somehow connected to the ‘Easterners.’ Two people whose names are identical to HAYOGEV’s are known to have Russian connections. HAYOGEV, too, speaks Russian.”

Double-decker buses circle the Prince Albert statue at Holborn Circus in London, England, in the smog at night on Dec. 6, 1962AP Photo

It was only natural for London to host secret meetings between former British subjects from both banks of the Jordan River. In the 1950’s and into the 60’s, Great Britain still loomed large over the Hashemite Kingdom, whose royal family sent its offspring to get manners and education at boarding schools and military academies there, and kept residences and bank accounts not far from Westminster. For the Hashemites, there’ll always be an England.

Which is why Avraham Cohen, recipient of the Aleph-HAYOGEV cable, and keen observer of London’s Middle East scene, also had custody over another even higher-value Jordan-related file: That of the mother of King Hussein, Queen Zein.

Why was a foreign ministry official mixed up in cultivating and assessing sources? At the time, tthe lines between various intelligence agencies were often blurred, with different personnel, ministries and secret services juggling sources and operations.

While Aleph was apparently a Mossad “rep,” this was also the heyday of Israel’s foreign ministry, a key player in the councils of state under Moshe Sharett and then Golda Meir. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, emulating Winston Churchill in World War II, also held the defense portfolio, thus controlling the entire intelligence community, including the Shin Bet and Mossad, which became, and remained, the intelligence agency “in the Prime Minister’s office.”

Both Ben-Gurion and Meir were veterans of negotiations with senior Arab figures before 1948 and after. The geopolitical framework to these contacts was clear: Egypt was the strongest nation facing Israel, the key to war and peace. Jordan, occupying the West Bank and East Jerusalem, was the most precarious.

King Abdullah I of Jordan in Amman on Oct. 8, 1947. Abdullah was killed in front of Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem at 1951AP Photo

Its King Abdullah, who secretly agreed to co-existence with Israel, was denounced as a traitor to the Arab cause and assassinated by a Palestinian at the Al-Aqsa mosque compound in 1951. His grandson, Hussein, ascended to the Hashemite throne when Talal, Hussein’s father, was passed over as mentally unfit to rule. He would, though the Israeli policy elite, be a welcome interlocutor – if he survived.

Born in 1935, Hussein became king at 18. At first, Israeli leaders were dismissive of his inexperience and gave short odds for his longevity. They called him “Hayenuka,” the child. Hussein’s demise was “a single bullet away,” mused Ben-Gurion, after one of many plots in Amman was foiled. That he would reign for 46 years, dying of natural causes, was unimaginable.

King Hussein of Jordan smiles during ab “Arabian Nights” ball in aid of the Anglo-Arab Association and the Holy Land Arab Refugee Fund in London in 1952 while a cadet at the Sandhurst military academyAP Photo

It turned out that Hussein would outwit the assassins and outlive Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Levi Eshkol, Meir, Menachem Begin and finally his peace partner, Yitzhak Rabin, struck by three bullets, as well as Anwar Sadat and numerous other Arab rulers who died violent deaths.

From the outset of his reign, Israel was not anathema to Hussein. He feared its rumored appetite to expand eastward, but was more concerned with designs by Egypt, Syria and Iraq against his fragile, almost landlocked, desert kingdom, whether by invasion, subversion or a combination of the two. He grew to consider Israel not only the lesser evil but a friend in need, cogently signaled by Israel giving British and U.S. forces overflight rights on their emergency mission to rescue him from an Arab nationalist revolt in 1958.

At that time, Hussein sent his military aide to establish covert contact with an IDF colonel, Chaim Herzog, soon to be head of Military Intelligence. Thus was established a secret channel between army officers, reporting to Hussein and Ben-Gurion, a rerun of 1948, when the interlocutors were Moshe Dayan and Abdullah Tal. But Israel wanted far more direct communication with the king. Another, more creative approach was needed.

It had to be step-by-step, because in the late 1950s, an Arab official just meeting with his Israeli counterpart carried an enormous personal risk. Israel, known for its leaks from the top and its inquisitive press, could not be counted on to keep the contact secret.

It would not matter what the meeting discussed or even if Israeli proposals were dismissed out of hand, the damage would be done. The very fact of contact with Israel would taint Hussein, as it did Sadat, in the eyes of the masses and could bring about his downfall. A preliminary screening by a trusted go-between, a Jordanian source who could vouch for Israel’s serious intent, would be essential.

In the suspicious, sometimes justifiably paranoid atmosphere of coups and intrigues, that go-between could not be a mere confidant. They could be treasonous and were expendable. Only one circle is relatively – pun excused – above reproach: Immediate family.

There is a caveat there, of course, what with this neighborhood being the birthplace of often lethal sibling rivalry. Amman may be old Philadelphi, the City of Brotherly Love, but the incumbent king, Abdullah II, has limited affection towards his half-brother Prince Hamza, who was only last year accused of plotting a coup. Over in Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is even less affectionate towards his House of Saud brethren and cousins, a number of whom he has detained without charge.

Greek mythology and Shakespearean drama aside, there is still one family member a monarch can still rely on: his (or her) mama, the Queen Mother. In theory, she always has her offspring’s best interest, which hopefully coincides with the nation’s, at heart. If she could only be persuaded to act as a conduit to him.

Hussein’s mother, Queen Zein, was particularly close to him, her eldest and most successful son. Her brother, Sherif Nasser bin Jamil, was Hussein’s buddy. Israel’s intelligence files described Uncle Nasser as a corrupt bully who had Hussein’s back, high praise in terms of the politics-plagued palace in Amman.

Zein’s movements were recorded in “The Queen’s File,” where press reports of her travel abroad were added to any gossip or speculation (“she is more than 50 years old and tired of her lifestyle”) that could help an approach to see if she would open the King’s door to Israel.

In September 1960, a Top Secret memo was entered into the Queen’s File. Avraham Cohen updated the foreign minister’s deputy D.G., Maurice Fisher, who in earlier postings to France and Turkey had participated in outreach efforts to Arab regimes.

“Re our activity to establish direct contact with King Hussein, we are inter alia looking into the possibility of doing it through his mother, Queen Zein,” reported Cohen. “While from time to time we get news of ups and downs in the mother-son relationship, as far as we know right now there is reason to believe that their relations are fine.”

Golda Meir, Israel’s Prime Minister, holds last minute talks with Defense Minister Moshe Dayan in Tel Aviv in September 24, 1969 before flying to the U.S., via London, for talks with President NixonAP Photo

Cohen recommended approaching Hussein this way, because “a direct appeal to the King through one of his men could in general be construed by him as an entrapment ploy; he would not have this concern if it was done by his mother, who is in London now.”

So now Queen Zein, in London, had been identified as a prime target for the getting-to-Hussein operation, but how to make the connection with her? Cohen had an idea: through her (Jewish) doctor.

Israeli embassies don’t have a staff physician. Medical care is provided to diplomats as needed. But sometimes there are delicate affairs which require the availability of a “trust doctor,” local M.D.s who would either take care of the patient themselves or refer them to a competent colleague, no questions asked.

In London, Cohen reminded Fisher, that trust doctor was Emmanuel Herbert, “a Jew and ardent Zionist who has also taken care of the Queen.” More than that, Herbert was a friend of the previous long-serving Israeli ambassador, and he””recently called on Mr. Shomron,” an embassy political counselor, “and once again raised the matter of his connections with Royal Jordanians.”

Dr Herbert’s role in facilitating the first meetings between Hussein and senior Israelis have been known for many years now. Zein’s name, too, was mentioned in this regard by Hussein’s biographer, Avi Shlaim. But the Cohen-Fisher memo reveals an amazing side to this ultimately hyper-successful facilitation: That Herbert had to take the initiative, indeed pestering the Israelis like a nudnik, to use the connection he was offering on a platter, the kind of exploitation of sources that a case officer would have been decorated for achieving.

“We ask permission to have Mr. Shomron approach Dr. Herbert and consider with him the possibility of him asking the Queen, as if on his own personal initiative, due to the current situation in Jordan, whether she would meet with an Israeli representative,” Cohen continued.

“Should the Queen refuse, no harm done, she just decided not to take up a private friend’s suggestion. If she agrees to confer with our representative, we will submit a detailed proposal regarding his identity, the venue and the security arrangements.”

King Hussein of Jordan, haggard and unshaven after three days of fighting in the Six Day War, announces in Amman that after suffering tremendous losses Jordan would observe a cease-fire with IsraelAP Photo

Five days later Fisher replied from the foreign ministry, but not in writing. Whatever came out of this operation is still a missing link in the chain that had four years later culminated in the good doctor’s hosting Hussein and the Foreign Ministry’s Yaakov Herzog, Chaim’s brother and uncle to Yitzhak, now President Herzog, for the king’s first meeting with an emissary of Israel’s government.

High-level meetings would ensue, the most momentous of all at the Mossad’s guesthouse two weeks before the Yom Kippur War, when Hussein warned then-Prime Minister Golda Meir that the Syrian Army was in “pre-jump positions.”

The details of what transpired in the conversation between the friendly physician and his royal patient, as well as between mother and son, how far they reflected scepticism or carefully calibrated interest, is not part of the record. Yet.

Did Zein talk Hussein into risking the meeting with Eshkol’s emissary? As the classic Clairol advertising slogan of the 1950s put it, “Did she…or didn’t she? Only her doctor knew for sure.” But what’s for sure is the longest informal alliance between Israel and an Arab state was born in those consulting rooms in London.

Amir Oren, a veteran observer of Israeli, American and NATO military and political affairs, has written for Haaretz on defense and government for more than two decades. Twitter: @Rimanero