The end of an era for undercover ops behind enemy lines

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The army’s decision to allow publication of the name and picture of Lt. Col. Mahmoud Kheir el-Din, who was killed in Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip in 2018, made waves both in the media and among the public. There’s almost nothing more exciting than stories of secret heroism, and Kheir el-Din was a true hero, killed during an undercover operation behind enemy lines.

For three and a half years, no identifying details about him could be published. Now, the army has changed its policy, thereby launching a moving conversation about the officer.

His family deserves this, as does the family of Lt. Col. Emmanuel Moreno, an officer in Sayeret Matkal, the General Staff’s reconnaissance unit. Moreno was killed during an operation deep inside Lebanon in 2006, just days after the Second Lebanon War ended. Ever since, the army has barred publication of his picture.

Mahmoud Kheir el-DinIDF spokesperon

Now, a renewed debate is taking place over this. It seems as if sufficient time has passed and the circumstances have changed enough for the army to rethink its position on this issue, too, given the similarity between these two cases.

In Kheir el-Din’s case, there was an additional reason. He was Druze, so publicizing his story could encourage army enlistment in a community in which the draft is more controversial nowadays than in the past.

The relationship between the Druze community and the state grew tense around the time of Kheir el-Din’s death due to the community’s opposition to the nation-state law. Many Druze were outraged by the state’s contradictory behavior – embracing them in the name of a “blood covenant” while harming them via legislation. Finance Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who was defense minister during the Khan Yunis operation and resigned shortly afterward, rightly said on Sunday that this law should be amended to eliminate its injustices.

But despite the admiration for this brave officer, it’s important to mention two other issues. First, despite the many citations awarded afterward, the Khan Yunis operation was a failure that could have produced a far worse outcome. Second, in retrospect, this operation seems like the last gasp of a world that has almost ceased to exist, as the field of special ops has changed beyond recognition.

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Kheir el-Din’s wife and friends said in interviews after his death that he was very worried before the operation – which was unlike him – and voiced fears that it could go wrong. An MI’s investigation after the operation revealed many flaws in the force’s preparations.

According to information released by Hamas, the fact that men and women were riding in the same car roused the suspicions of members of Hamas’ territorial battalion. They detained the car’s occupants for questioning that became threatening and violent. An Israeli officer, Lt. Col. A, then opened fire, killing seven Hamas members. He also accidentally killed Kheir el-Din and wounded other Israeli soldiers.

The Israeli team, with great resourcefulness, managed to escape. Thanks to the courage of air force helicopter crews and cool–headed decision-making by the General Staff, the incident ended without the Israelis being taken prisoner by Hamas.

But this was a very close brush with what could have been a much bigger disaster. Hamas could have captured soldiers knowledgeable about Israel’s most classified intelligence operations and used them as bargaining chips. In comparison, the case of abducted soldier Gilad Shalit would have seemed like small potatoes.

The renewed discussion of the Khan Yunis operation also raises a broader issue. The Israeli intelligence community, like its counterparts worldwide, is faced with new technology at border crossings, airports and border fences. The multiplicity of security cameras backed by facial recognition technology and biometric passports makes it harder for intelligence agents to move around, infiltrate across borders or travel undercover.

Following the Khan Yunis operation, the Arab media reported that the Israelis entered Gaza with false documents, posing as volunteers for an international organization. Their goal, the reports said, was to plant wiretaps in Hamas communications systems.

In other words, according to the Palestinians, Israel took an enormous risk (and indeed, got into trouble) by employing a rather outdated modus operandi. It’s no secret that the vast majority of intelligence today is gathered remotely, mainly by hacking computers and cellphones. Not only can a huge quantity of information be obtained this way, but it involves minimal risk, since it doesn’t require physically being in enemy territory.

In retrospect, the Khan Yunis snafu was another step toward the end of secret operations. The harder it is to overcome the obstacles deployed by the enemy, the more senior officials will hesitate to approve such risky operations.