I’ve been writing on Israeli intel for ages. Then Iran tried to kidnap me

Read More

On November 23, I received the following WhatsApp message: “May I introduce myself. My name is Oliver Thranert, and I am the head of the think tank at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. It is my pleasure to invite you to Strategic Dialogue Zurich, which will take place on January 14.”

There was nothing unusual about the invitation itself. I have been invited to international conferences in Europe, the United States and Asia on subjects I’ve been writing about for decades. What aroused my initial suspicion was the explanation in the next message. It’s common practice to send such invitations by email. On this occasion, the person contacting me explained that he had sent an invitation by email, but that I hadn’t responded. I rushed to check my inbox, including the spam and trash folders, and couldn’t find it.

LISTEN: ‘Putin’s own paranoia will bring NATO to his doorstep’

The first thing I did was to check online to see if Oliver Thranert existed, as well as the university and the think tank. A search revealed that there is indeed such a university (considered a good one, too) and that the think tank also exists – and is, indeed, headed by Oliver Thranert, whose picture on the university website matched the one on the WhatsApp account.

Iranian plot to lure Israelis abroad and kidnap them foiled, Shin Bet says

Tehran assassination: Latest move in secret Israel-Iran war

Iran’s latest effort to recruit spies targets Israeli weak spot

But my suspicions were not allayed. I wondered why the WhatsApp message came from a phone number in Pennsylvania. I called the number, getting no answer. I sent a message asking why he, the head of a Swiss institute, had a U.S. telephone number. He said he had been a visiting scholar in the U.S. for some time and had kept his American phone number. These two red flags increased my suspicions, and I came to the conclusion that it was a hacker trying to get access to my accounts – or worse, a hostile actor.

Demonstrators burn representations of Israeli, British and U.S. flags during the annual pro-Palestinians Al-Quds, or Jerusalem, Day rally in Tehran, Iran, last month.Vahid Salemi /AP

For years, I’ve received warnings from Israeli security officials that hostile elements such as Iran and Hezbollah read my articles to try and get useful information from them. I learned that other Israeli journalists writing on security and military matters have also been asked to remain alert by security officials.

Additional confirmation of the fact that Israel’s adversaries have shown interest in me and my writing came about two and a half years ago. On a rainy and stormy evening in December 2019, I gave a talk on Hezbollah and Israel at a bar in Tel Aviv.

One of the attendees was Mai-Bat Masarwa, a 27-year-old political science major at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. When I asked whether she hadn’t been reluctant to make the journey from Be’er Sheva in such bad weather, she said, “I am very interested in the topics you write about and it was important to me that I come.” About three months later, I learned that the Shin Bet security service had arrested her for spying on behalf of Hezbollah.

She was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to two and a half years in prison. One of the assignments she received from her handler in Lebanon was to attend my talk and ask me whether Israel was going to attack Hezbollah. My answer, by the way, was that Israel has no plans to initiate an attack on the Shi’ite Muslim organization, but would respond with unprecedented force in a war launched by Hezbollah.

Participants at the World Economic Forum 2022 in Davos, Switzerland. An alarming invitation. ARND WIEGMANN/ REUTERS

I decided to cease contact with Thranert. I continued to receive conference invitations on WhatsApp, which only reinforced my suspicions. To convince me of the sincerity of his intentions, he even attached a list of invitees, which included the heads of Swiss intelligence services and cabinet ministers from European Union member states.

In the meantime, I learned that the same person claiming to be Thranert had invited a very prominent academic, a former Israeli ambassador to the conference in Switzerland. I called him to relay my suspicions. I also contacted a private security company and asked them to check my computer. They found nothing suspicious, but advised me to change all the passwords I had stored on it and on my cellphone, just to be sure, and I did.

I also relayed my concerns to the Shin Bet and met with an agency official, telling him everything I knew. I was asked not to publish the details so as not to interfere with the investigation. Last Thursday, the Shin Bet said in an announcement that it had uncovered an operation by Iranian intelligence, the Revolutionary Guards and the Guards’ Quds Force targeting Israeli academics and former defense officials. One academic traveled to Switzerland, and the Shin Bet alerted him and advised him to return to Israel immediately. The Israel Hayom newspaper reported, including on its English-language website, that one of the targets of the Iranian operation was former Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon.

The method worked like this: Iranian intelligence used the identities of real people, like Thranert, to try and lure targets to a meeting place. It isn’t clear how and to where the Iranians planned to abduct or assassinate us, as the Shin Bet believes they hoped to do, but it’s conceivable that we might have been given a tour of a neighboring country where the operation could be completed.

A demonstrator clenches his fist through a torn up representation of the Israeli flag in the annual pro-Palestinian Al-Quds, or Jerusalem, Day rally in Tehran, Iran, last month.Vahid Salemi /AP

Identity theft or the use of fake profiles is just one of a many methods that Iran employs to spy on Israel and to abduct and kill Israelis. Most of this activity takes place in the virtual world, but in the past 15 years there have also been attempts around the world to assassinate Israeli diplomats or other official representatives.

Israel, too, uses every means at its disposal to spy on Iran, including electronic surveillance and in-person meetings, and according to foreign reports it has also assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists.

It’s a covert war, usually through proxies, that has gone on for decades on every continent. In recent years, the focus of the struggle has been in the air and on the ground in Syria and in Iran, in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, as well as online. Fortunately, thanks to the capabilities of the Shin Bet, the Mossad and Military Intelligence, Iran is struggling to achieve its goals, and Israel has prevailed. The Iranian regime is a difficult enemy – its leaders speak explicitly about Israel’s destruction – but despite the heated rhetoric and its actions on the ground, it is also cautious and it recognizes its weaknesses and limitations. Israel must therefore continue to covertly act against it, and to avoid arrogant talk like threats of a military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.