Why South Africa is not a ‘failed state’

Read More

Is South Africa a “failed state”? 

For all the gnashing of teeth, not to mention the hyperbolic commentary on both social and mainstream media, a visitor from Mars might be forgiven for thinking that the answer to this simple yet emotive question is yes. 

But the Martian might well have a wider perspective. They might well view the facts on the ground in relative terms. Compared with the state of infrastructure or the quality of the rule of law on Mars, South Africa might be, well, like Nirvana in comparison. 

Or much worse. From the Martian’s point of view, as bad, perhaps, as Uranus. 

Yet, that would also fall into the same trap that observers of South Africa’s current predicaments fall into by setting the country up against Australia or Somalia — but, far more often Australia, hence the trenchant, usually shrill laments.

The reason that it’s a trap is the concept of a “failed state” is not a relative one. It’s an absolute one. “Failed state” is even more than a term of art. The relevant academic literature imposes application of certain criteria.  

It’s clear that global capital markets operate in the realm of the relative rather than the absolute. They don’t make investment choices or asset management decisions based on whether economy X does or does not conform to certain clearly-defined criteria. 

Or at least not often. Usually it is pitting South Africa (or its rand) against, say, Turkey (and its lira). If there’s a sell-off of one, but not the other, it tends to be because A now looks bad, or weak, compared with B, rather than upon the application of some careful data-based analysis. Or very rarely so. 

It is more hunch and instinct than science or reason, which is why sentiment matters and why rumours of a “failed state” can do unnecessary harm. 

Loose talk can cost lives — or livelihoods at least. 

For multinational companies operating in South Africa, a similar risk arises. Shareholders or boards of directors in, say, New York or Frankfurt or London or Beijing, can get surprisingly jittery, and then seek reassurance. 

Confidence can ebb, as well as flow. 

This is one not insignificant part of the complex context that the administration of President Cyril Ramaphosa and his turnaround strategy has to contend with. 

Every time the lights go out and every time there is a report of another town without running water for the nth day in a row, trust in the president’s ability to execute the turnaround diminishes. 

To answer the core question — is SA a “failed state”? — one must first go back to “what is a state”? and the Weberian notion of a state as defined in terms of its capability to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in its borders.

This apparently primitive fundamental definition still holds water and informs the myriad attempts to define state failure in the century that have followed since the German sociologist made such a mark on scholarly understanding of state and organisational power and authority. 

For a state to exist, it must be able to control and coerce its subjects. It must be able to both make the rules and enforce them.

Losing this coercive power is the most fundamental indicator of state failure. 

Hackles may rise in response to this simple observation. Well exactly, South Africa is “lawless” — look at the looting that takes place, the in-broad-daylight larceny, the theft of basic infrastructure such as copper piping, and alleged sabotage at Eskom, and so on and so forth. 

That may be the impression. Clearly, there is ample evidence to justify concern that law and order is not what it should be, and that it is falling short of what is desirable. 

But, on closer examination, other questions have to be asked, such as: are there other militias operating in the country threatening the coercive force of the state? Despite what happened during the July 2021 unrest, where there was clearly a concerted attempt to destroy law and order and cause the maximum amount of destruction, this is generally not the case.  

Vigilante justice, such as the reprehensible Operation Dudula, can also shake confidence in the state. But, for all its manifold weaknesses and shortcomings, the state still has a legitimate grip on the security apparatus.

Try places such as Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Chad or the Central African Republic if you want to grasp the difference — not, I hasten to add, because that is how you measure it, but because that is how you can shed light on the objective criteria. 

Relativity has its uses in this regard. As someone (an English judge) once said about pornography, so it may be with a “failed state” that it may be hard to define but one knows it when one sees it. 

A “failed state” is catastrophic. It suggests an absolute, perhaps irreversible, inability of any legitimately-formed government to perform the functions of a government and with no hope of immediate recovery. 

The result is chaos, para-militias or vigilante mobs running amok, and a full paralysis of the machinery of the state. South Africa is not there. 

Much of the angst about South Africa rotates about the chaotic and often corrupt character of the ANC. Again, there is justifiable concern about the contagion effect on democratic governance of an unruly ruling party. 

But the failure of a single or even several government administrations and/or the party that has power is not the same thing when there exists a reasonable prospect that the underperforming government can be voted out through a peaceful process. 

In that case, the state is still functioning, even though the particular government may not be — which is an important distinction.

This is why indicators such as free and fair elections, and the peaceful transition of power, are critical in assessing state fragility. 

South Africa has important safeguards against state failure, and against the abuse of power by a president or a government. Thanks to former president Jacob Zuma we now know this to be true. He provided the Constitution with a very real stress test, and the Constitution prevailed. 

The Zondo commission of inquiry into state capture is the manifestation of this institutional resilience. It was appointed by the same government under which state capture had occurred (albeit a different president, following the December 2017 palace coup in the ruling party), and it has made significant findings about what transpired and why. 

The scholarship has moved away from rigid conclusions as to whether a state has failed; instead it uses the concept of a continuum of state fragility, particularly with poor or developing countries. 

“Fragile states” are countries that are particularly vulnerable to outbreaks of large-scale violence or war. 

There is also the notion of a “resilient state”, which can go through periods of low growth or extreme poverty, but still avoid large-scale violence or full state collapse. South Africa is much better positioned on the side of a resilient state than a fragile one on this continuum, although substantive, structural inequality is its Achilles heel in this respect. 

The most respected of various modern attempts to measure or “score” countries is the Fund for Peace’s “Fragile State Index”. In terms of this index, South Africa is ranked 89 out 179 countries (with 1 being the most fragile) — pretty much halfway up the field. 

This offers a good indication of how far away South Africa is from the problems of some of the world’s most fragile states, and how far it would still have to fall before any sensible talk of state failure.

But it has declined considerably, according to this index, since the start of the Zuma era, having been ranked at 132 in 2007. 

What is South Africa’s prognosis — further decline or will the turnaround really bite and allow for a decent recovery and rise back up the fragility league table? And if the decline cannot be arrested, will we be able to tell when the point of no return is reached and an inexorable slide towards “failure” occurs? 

Or is it a case of being the proverbial frog in boiling water and not being able to detect the danger that lies ahead? 

South Africa is not a failed state, far from it. 

That being said, its fragility indicators have been in steady decline for more than a decade and, if not arrested, the country is still capable of moving from a resilient developing country to one that is genuinely fragile. 

While a sense of perspective is needed, this is neither the time for panic or complacency. 

This column draws on a research report prepared by political risk consultancy, The Paternoster Group, where Richard Calland — an associate professor of public law at the University of Cape Town — is a partner. 

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Mail & Guardian.