‘Herr Hezbollah’: The German spy who mediated between Israel and terror groups speaks for first time

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In Germany, he was known as “Herr Hezbollah,” but he could also have been given the title “Herr Hamas.” For 30 years, Gerhard Conrad was a top foreign intelligence officer in Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (the BND), a loyal counterpart of the Mossad.

In the course of his various roles in the organization, he frequently lived or spent time in Damascus, Beirut, Gaza, Cairo and Jerusalem (among other places in the Middle East). But he is best known for his involvement in Israel’s prisoner exchanges with Hezbollah and Hamas.

These included the Gilad Shalit deal (next month will mark the 10th anniversary of the Israeli soldier’s release from Gaza); the deal for the release of drug dealer Col. Elhanan Tannenbaum from Lebanon; the deal for the return of the bodies of Israel Defense Forces soldiers Benny Avraham, Adi Avitan and Omar Sawaid, and also later Eldad Regev and Udi Goldwasser.

He also negotiated the deal that saw the release of terrorist Samir Kuntar, who murdered the Haran family in Nahariya, and the release of another 1,500 or so Palestinian and Lebanese terrorists, and other foreign terrorists.

“I always acted after being authorized by the federal government of Germany and with the guidelines and instructions of my organization as requested by Israeli governments,” he says in an exclusive interview with Haaretz – the first interview Conrad has given to any media outlet, after operating in the shadows for many years. His name and face were kept out of the press until a Berlin newspaper leaked his details in 2009.

He retired a few years ago but continues to follow events in Israel and the Middle East, and is extremely knowledgeable about what is going on.

“Such deals only happen when the stars are aligned,” he says, when asked about the odds of a deal between Hamas and Israel.

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From abduction to release

Then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak greeting Gilad Shalit in October 2011, with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu alongside the just-released Israeli soldier.
Ariel Hermony / Defense Ministry

“You may develop a kind of contractual framework – indeed, you should if your counterpart is ready – but don’t expect that an agreement will be more than tentative as long as no additional benefits encourage both sides to go ahead,” he says.

“The deals are always considered as bad on both sides, and will be contested by those who feel that too much has been conceded to the ‘enemy’ for too little in return,” he adds. “Many will be disappointed for not being ‘on the list,’ others will be deeply frustrated to see the killers of their beloved ones free and triumphant. Responsibility weighs heavily on the respective decision-makers’ shoulders; political accountability can be demanding or even be dangerous.”

What advice can you give Israel’s current negotiators with Hamas?

“Be patient and try to prepare a solid framework with terms of reference that are agreed as much as possible between the two sides, and a list of possibly already-agreed action/exchange items. Don’t try to force it unless you have really good cards, in terms of an offer and powerful friends with a real, positive – and negative – influence on your counterpart, and a sincere, credible political interest in getting it done – ultimately for their own sake and standing toward your country, your counterpart, and in the region in general as power broker.”

Terrorist Samir Kuntar after his release from Israeli prison after an exchange for the bodies of two fallen Israeli soldiers, in 2008.
AP

Although he clearly identifies with Israel and its values, it was Conrad’s basic qualities that also enabled him to earn the trust of terror organizations.

“He is very thorough, reliable, precise. A man of details who leaves no loose ends,” says former Shin Bet deputy chief Ofer Dekel, who from 2006-2009 was the prime minister’s coordinator for Israeli prisoners of war and those missing in action.

Through Conrad, Dekel advanced the indirect contacts with Hezbollah, in meetings in Europe and Israel, and also prepared the groundwork for the 2011 Shalit deal – though that deal was ultimately concluded by his successor, Mossad official David Meidan.

Germany’s man in Damascus

Gerhard Conrad was born in Germany in 1954. In the 1970s and ’80s, he studied Arabic at university and specialized in Islamic law, reading and researching the writings of Islamic sages. He went on to study German and international law. While earning his doctorate from the University of Bonn, he worked as a reserve air force officer in the Defense Ministry.

Gerhard Conrad. ‘He is very thorough, reliable, precise. A man of details who leaves no loose ends,’ says former Shin Bet deputy chief Ofer Dekel.

With such a background, it was no surprise that Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service was eager to recruit him. In 1990, after completing a training course, he joined the organization, initially as a researcher and Middle East expert, and later in operational roles. His wife also worked for the agency.

One of his most important missions was in 1998, when he was assigned as the agency’s representative in Damascus, and then Beirut. He worked under diplomatic cover at the German embassies in both capitals, using the title of “cultural attache.” But almost everyone who came into contact with him understood he was in intelligence. He calls that kind of work “diplomatic intelligence.”

One of his most interesting encounters was with top Hezbollah figure Mustafa Badreddine, the cousin and brother-in-law of Imad Mughniyeh. Both are no longer with us. Mughniyeh, who was considered Hezbollah’s “defense minister,” was assassinated in Damascus in 2008, in a joint operation attributed to the CIA and Mossad. Badreddine, who was the commander of Hezbollah’s external operations branch in Syria, was assassinated at Damascus airport in May 2016, on the orders of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, then-commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ Al Quds Force.

Badreddine had a reputation for being particularly savage, wild and capricious. Conrad chooses his words carefully in describing him.

“His temper was, let’s say, volatile, ranging from ‘Prince Charming’ with a buoyant, broad smile, to being aggressive – though still predominantly controlled by etiquette – caused, by the way, by physical and neurological pain [from] his diverse wounds, including an amputated lower leg and wooden prosthesis.”

In 2002, Conrad finished his term in Beirut, from where he had closely monitored Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon and seen the centrality of international terrorism following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United States. He was posted to the research division at his agency’s headquarters in Pullach, south of Munich, where he worked on research assignments as well as operational ones. But not for long. Agency chief Ernst Urlau soon dispatched him to oversee the efforts to secure the release of Austrian and German hostages who were seized in the Sahara Desert, in southern Algeria and Mali.

“That engagement vividly showed me firsthand quite a number of limitations and constraints for decision makers in managing – not to speak of solving – such crises with all their multiple moral and operational dilemmas,” he says.

“By the end of the Algerian hostage crisis, I was taken away again by the Lebanese file, when interest on all sides to go for a deal reemerged: ‘Delete Bamako, set Beirut’ was my sigh when I entered, together with my superior, an MEA flight from Paris to Beirut instead of accompanying a German secretary of state to the final mission to Mali, where he was able to welcome the released hostages and show his appreciation to the Malian government of the time.”

He continues: “Until 2004, I was heavily engaged as ‘No.2’ in a negotiation team [Urlau also came to several mediation meetings], in a multitude of different secret missions in the region, in order to promote a hostage deal that was of course not only ‘owned’ by Israel and Hezbollah, but as well by other actors – among them, unsurprisingly, as it was well known, Iran and to a certain extent also Syria.”

But, Conrad adds, “the exchange of 2004,” when the bodies of Avraham, Avitan and Sawaid were returned to Israel, “did not solve all issues on both sides.”

Col. Elhanan Tannenbaum, whose release from Lebanon was secured by Conrad.
Dan Keinan

He says Hezbollah was furious that, at the last minute, Israel refused to include Kuntar among the prisoners being released. He believes that this was one of the pretexts that indirectly led to the Second Lebanon War two years later. Hezbollah intensified its efforts to abduct Israeli soldiers until, in July 2006, it captured Regev and Goldwasser – a move that prompted then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to go to war. Kuntar was released two years later, in the deal that saw the return of Regev and Goldwasser’s remains.

The second matter that stymied Conrad’s mediation efforts was the case of missing Israel Air Force navigator Ron Arad; Hezbollah had pledged to provide information about his fate.

“In 2004 and 2005, quite impressive efforts had been undertaken by all sides – also by a special task force in Germany on ‘historical forensics’ – led by me, in order to narrow down and of course ultimately solve the tragic case – as you know, in vain,” he says. “These were again times of major engagement, thorough security of intelligence findings, circumstantial historical evidence and documents, and, ultimately, deep frustration for all sides concerned.”

The contacts were run on behalf of Hezbollah by Hajj Wafiq Safa, who was in charge of the organization’s coordination and liaison unit, and also the brother-in-law of the secretary-general. Conrad recreates the first meeting between them after the Second Lebanon War, which took place at a modest cafe in a Beirut mall – not exactly an ideal place for such negotiations.

“After a kind exchange of greetings, congratulations, ultimately for having survived, and words of appreciation for being ready to support my efforts as UN facilitator, the question arose of where to meet for our business in the future – whereupon Safa answered in his perfectly sober, laconic and apt way while smiling and shrugging his shoulders: ‘My friend, no houses left.’

“We agreed that a way would be found in the difficult weeks ahead, and, of course, Hezbollah managed as usual to carry on and to arrange. But in a way, it was one of the quintessential moments when all of us understood what had happened and where we had been put by the events” of the war.

In 2009, after three years of failed efforts to advance a deal for the release of Shalit, who was abducted near the Kerem Shalom crossing in June 2006, Conrad was once again called upon to work on a prisoner-exchange deal.

He explains that the big problem was the deep mistrust that existed between Israel and Hamas – a mistrust expressed by the fact that each side seriously questioned the other’s intentions and willingness to fulfill its obligations. Furthermore, the two sides believed the other was treacherous. So how did Conrad manage to overcome these considerable obstacles?

“With all modesty, my credentials as ‘Mr. Hezbollah’ had not gone unnoticed by Hamas – not least due to their connections in Lebanon and Syria,” he says. “Hence, it was not too difficult for them to agree, of course with due caution, to the new format.”

Senior Hamas figures he met had been reassured by Hezbollah’s testimony that Conrad was a man who could be trusted.

The plan with Shalit was “to use the proof of life exercise as a kind of dry run for an exchange operation, showing to both sides that it was possible and rewarding to honor one’s own pledges and to trust to those of the sworn enemy. I will never forget the sense of pride, relief and satisfaction on both sides,” he recalls.